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Prior to being a simple concept, the entrepreneurial failure is a multidimensional
phenomenon. To contribute to its comprehension, this paper proposes to develop a
synthetic vision of failure in order to escape a behavioral and partial approach from
the phenomenon while taking account of the context, the characteristics of the
company, and the profile of the entrepreneur. We point out the various theories
which insist upon the crucial role of the context and underline the relationships
between the performance (or failure) of companies and some environmental
variables. We also introduce a dynamic view of insolvency which, instead of being a
clear-cut situation is better handled as a process. As a key element taken into
account by potential creditors to make their decision, the final section proposes a
survey of the different methods used to forecast this event.
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Introduction
Following the bank crashes that induced one of the worst turmoil, the developed econ-
omies experienced, the European sovereign debt crisis, which had begun in 2010, con-
tinues to shape the insolvency scene. In the Western European countries, the number
of corporate collapses rose year-on-year by a margin of 0.3% - from 174,463 in 2010 to
174,917 in 2011 (Mohr 2012), a historically high level. The high number of business
failures together with the increasing incidence of major company collapses led to a rise
in the number of insolvency-related job losses. From 1.4 million in 2010, this figure
has risen to 1.5 million in 2011, corresponding to a year-on-year increase of 7.1%
(Table 1 provides more precise figures on the breaking down of insolvencies by country).
No industry is immune to this phenomenon. Due to their quantitative importance
on the whole economy, the commerce (wholesale/retail including catering/hotels) and
construction represent the highest relative contributions to the European insolvency vol-
ume. The shrinking of manufacturing industry induced by the exit of large subsidiaries or
plant closures is however responsible for the larger share of job losses. Beyond the crisis,
what can be said about the reasons why so many companies are distressed? To handle this
question, this paper proposes a survey on the literature on entrepreneurship and industrial
economy. This perspective does not aim at minimizing the role played by the business cli-
mate in the macroeconomic context. Indeed, following Wadhwani (1986), many scholarsLevratto; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
2013
Table 1 Insolvencies in Europe
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Austria 6,194 6,657 7,050 6,500 6,362 6,854 7,136
Belgium 10,182 9,570 9,430 8,476 7,678 7,617 7,878
Denmark 5,447 6,461 5,600 3,709 2,401 1,987 2,497
Finland 3,005 2,864 3,310 2,612 2,254 2,285 2,278
France 49,506 51,060 55,800 49,723 42,532 40,360 41,930
Germany 30,200 32,060 34,300 29,580 29,150 34,040 36,850
Greece 452 355 360 359 524 532 612
Ireland 1,631 1,525 1,400 773 363 304 327
Italya 11,792 10,089 9,098 6,498 5,518 8,827 17,150
Luxembourg 961 918 698 590 680 634 682
Netherlands 7,000 7,211 10,500 6,847 7,952 5,941 6,780
Norway 4,361 4,435 5,100 3,637 2,845 3,032 3,540
Portugal 6,025 5,144 4,450 3,267 2,123 2,400 2,300
Spain 5,752 4,845 4,900 2,528 880 853 869
Sweden 7,177 7,546 7,600 6,298 5,791 5,243 5,865
Switzerlandb 6,661 6,255 5,215 4,222 4,314 4,528 4,751
United Kingdom 18,571 17,468 20,300 16,268 12,893 13,686 13,462
Total 174,917 174,463 185,111 151,887 134,260 139,123 154,907
aSince 2006, the insolvency statistics compiled by the register of companies in Italy include only company headquarters
and no longer the individual branches of a company.
bSince 1/1/2008, companies can be officially closed down and deleted from the register by means of bankruptcy
proceedings: Section 731b OR. Source: Creditreform Economic Research Unit (2012).
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in this paper has more to do with the individual causes and the firm's life cycle.
Research on entrepreneurship used to insist upon business creation, firm growth, andmarket expansion which are then the shining side of economic activity. However, a
dark side of entrepreneurial ventures exists as risks become effective and cause the fail-
ure of the firm. Exit is generally considered a sign of failure of the firm, a consequence
of poor performance; firms that underperform as they compete in the market will,
sooner or later, exit the market. This process is better worth knowing at least for two
main reasons: firstly, the Shumpeterian concept of creative destruction, which describes
the process of transformation that accompanies radical innovation, which supposes the
replacement of established companies by new entrants, involves the exit of a certain
number of existing firms. Besides this renewal of productive system it ensures, exit can
also have a positive value since individuals who have closed down the company they
owned or managed in the previous year are more likely to engage successfully in a fu-
ture entrepreneurial activity. Secondly, despite the efforts and measures adopted by the
USA, the rate of exit of new entrants barely decreases below 50% before their fifth
birthday and the global rate of corporate bankruptcy demonstrates a rare stickiness ex-
cept when the law changes. It is then essential to determine a pattern of failure and exit
in accordance with these theoretical and factual dimensions.
This question is all the more important since insolvency is a cost for the whole econ-
omy. It however bears unequally on the economic agents as the small companies pay a
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trated by the attention paid by the governments to the modernization of their bankruptcy
regimes. Collective frameworks have been proposed by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF 1999), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD
1998), and the European Union (European-Commission 2007). The changes brought
are however considered as not sufficient to significantly improve the system. How-
ever, what a good system should be is still a debated question among academists
and practitioners. The point is that no universal agreement exists on this point
even if it is broadly admitted, following Franks and Torous (1992) that bankrupt
small-to-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) fall into two categories: those that are
economically distressed and not viable which should be put out from the market
and those that are experiencing temporary financial difficulty and whose distress is due to
peculiar events or conditions which should be supported. A performing system is sup-
posed to be able to make a good screening of these two kinds of profiles, i.e., it allows
temporarily distressed companies to be rescued and definitely compromised situations to
be solved by a liquidation. As underlined by an abundant literature on this topic, the
crucial stake at this stage of the insolvency path consists in minimizing the occur-
rence of type 1 and type 2 errors, i.e., to liquidate firms whose probability of re-
covery is definitely compromised whereas the companies which still have either
credit or capability to restore their market share should be supported. When
enacted, such a system is able to strenghten economic growth resulting from entre-
preneurship. However, as deplored by Cook et al. (2012), ‘the literature provides lit-
tle practical guidance on how such a choice should be made’ (p. 276). That is why,
in a quite recent overview of bankruptcy law design, Lee et al. (2007) concluded
that the topic is still ‘an important but understudied area’ (p. 268).
The problems most of scholar and practitioners face whenever it is questioned to de-
fine, understand, or prevent firm failure start with the definition of insolvency and its
differentiation with bankruptcy. However, the definition of a borderline which separates
going concerns from defaulting company is not the final purpose of research dealing
with insolvency. Instead, an abundant literature is devoted to the identification of de-
terminants of default or failure thanks to the identification of discriminant functions
able to discriminate between healthy companies and firms that are likely to fail in the
near future. Most of this research aims to identify the items of the balance sheet or
the profit and loss account able to reflect the distress of the firm. However, focusing
on the predictive signal of insolvency, this literature mainly deals with the symptoms
of default and not with the causes. That is why, a growing number of work go one
step beyond the question of expectation to study the causes of exit in order to prevent
failure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the ‘Defining insolvency’ section
considers the variety of definitions of insolvency and puts some order in differentiating
default, insolvency and bankruptcy; ‘A large variety of causes of insolvency’ section pre-
sents the literature dealing with the prediction of insolvency looking at its more visible
manifestations whereas the ‘Different individual causes’ section insists upon the effi-
cient causes or primary sources of failure which have more to do with the productive
combination and the market positioning of the company than with the financial and
accounting ratios.
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In his seminal paper on corporate insolvency, Armour (2001) makes a distinction be-
tween six different meanings of the term ‘insolvency’. Departing from the colloquial
sense of the word that has to do with an inability to pay creditors, he attempts to clarify
between the accounting concepts of balance sheet insolvency, cash flow insolvency, and
economic failure on the one hand and the judicial aspects of default that follow a path
from insolvency proceedings and reorganization to liquidation on the other. This ex-
tensive approach to firms in distress presents the huge advantage of encompassing the
diversity of possible judgments made by commercial courts in cases of corporate
insolvencya. Moreover, such a complex and refined typology of failure is hardly compat-
ible with an empirical analysis of the phenomenon which is most of the time centered
on the determination of a discriminant function able to distinguish two classes of firms
according to their respective economic health (Rahman et al. 2004; Bose and Pal 2006).
The problems emerge because corporate insolvency is still missing a general definition
broadly accepted by the community of authors working on this topic.
Most of the time, a firm is considered as financially distressed whenever the book
value of its assets is less than those of its liabilities. From this point of view, the Basel II
criteria define a firm as being ‘in default’ when its scheduled payments are delayed for
more than 90 days. This approach which is focused on a cash flow conception is advan-
tageously complemented by a stock perspective which compares the available assets to
current liabilities (Belcher 1997). If such a definition presents an indisputable use as far
as one is interested in the particular situation of a specific company, the expert judg-
ment it rests upon does not fit with the study of the general situation of a large number
of companies or with the determination of a function that permits to separate operating
firms from insolvent ones. To do so, a simpler but clearer definition of insolvency is re-
quired. This is the reason why most of the papers dealing with discrimination between
going concerns and insolvent ones refer thus to legal rules to draw a clear separating
line between these two classes. In this case, a company is thus considered as insolvent
when it files for bankruptcy or when a court decides it should be liquidated.
The attribution of success and/or failure to small firms is thus complex, dynamic,
and problematic. Broadly speaking, insolvency is defined as an incapacity to pay debts
upon the date when they become due in the ordinary course of business. This defin-
ition permits to make a distinction between healthy companies as they respect their
contractual commitments and distress companies which are just about to file for a peti-
tion. Such a definition, however, has a drawback. It tends indeed to create a confusion
between insolvency and default mainly seen as the non-repayment of a debt by the lit-
erature devoted to the functioning of credit market. The word ‘insolvency’ refers then
primarily to a corporate reality which is not so simple to define as far as one is
concerned in differentiating defaulting firms from going concerns.
However, establishing a clear dividing line between the two previous kinds of com-
panies is a key challenge in the proposal of a typology of companies according to their
degree of robustness. It is all the more important that such a distinction is mandatory
for bank in accordance with Basel II, and coming Basel III, principles and that an in-
creasing number of research aims to propose an empirical analysis of distressed firms.
To cope with these goals, two polar definitions of insolvency are currently used in eco-
nomics; the first one is economic whereas the second one refers to judicial rules.
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According to the advocates of the economic conception, insolvency is defined as a set
of situations of failure such as the non-repayment of a debt, the inability to pay divi-
dends to the shareholders, the financial distress, etc., which can lead, or not, to the be-
ginning of a judicial proceeding. In such an approach, the suspension of a company is
then conceived like the result of a progressive process. Some authors, as Zopounidis
(1995), propose a very extensive view of the phenomenon. Default is just another word
to describe a company unable to make profit, whose capital does not create value
mostly because the continuum of enterprise-produced good market has become incon-
sistent. Such a company is also defaulting because it does not contribute to solve social
problems such as unemployment or purchasing power increase. This broad definition
is however too large to be operating what leads another part of the literature to focus
on payment problems.
Indeed, the inability to repay the due amounts is a clear signal of default allowing to
distinguish safe from risky companies. This definition is adopted by Ooghe and Van
Wymmersch (1996). According to these authors, a company, it is said to be insolvent
when it cannot anymore reach its economic goals in a socially and legally constrained
environment. This distress is also characterized by the fact that, during all this process,
the company is unable to fulfill in a regular way the commitment towards its various part-
ners. Indeed, the problems which a company can encounter must be analysed as a continu-
ous and cumulative process: the failure starts with small difficulties which are gradually
transformed into more serious problems. Some works, following Beaver (1966), thus tried
to propose models in which the non-payment is used like the signal of the failure of the
company. Because of the low level of correct classification provided by this fuzzy definition,
the term ‘default’ is no longer used to empirically illustrate the concept of failure.
In order to escape the blind alley resulting from the strict assimilation between in-
solvency and default, some authors have considered other events. A company is then
considered as insolvent if it is no longer able to meet its economic, financial, and social
objectives on a regular basis. Some go even further by considering that firms enter in
periods of decline when they fail to anticipate, recognize, neutralize, or adapt to exter-
nal and internal pressures that threaten their long-term survival. The separation be-
tween the failing companies and the others based on different performance criteria is
proposed by Platt and Platt (2002). They draw a line between going concerns and dis-
tressed firms having experienced either several years of losses or decreases in the distri-
bution of dividends or a major restructuring. Beaver (1966) is representative of this
approach and defines the failure as the result of the inability of a company to meet its
commitments once they have reached maturity. The results are quite poor however
and become even worse when the purpose is to discriminate between profitable firms
and non-profitable ones because no function properly separates the two classes. More
recently, this approach has also been adopted by Bose and Pal (2006) who obtained
prediction rates ranging between 65% and 75% in their attempt to separate companies
a priori considered as financially healthy from those which are not.
The problems encountered in testing the different borderlines between viable firms
and those that are going to fail come from the fact that the separation between these
two situations is both porous and blurred. That is why numerous studies agree that the
cessation of payments is the final step of a process, sometimes called ‘a spiral of failure’,
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From a legal to a managerial perspective
The second set of papers considers failure from a legal point of view. It is then defined
on the basis of judicial criteria introduced in the insolvency act enacted in a given
country at a given period. Most legal rules considered a firm as bankrupt when the
judge decides it is not able to make its repayments when the claims fall due (Cabrillo
and Depoorter 1999). Insolvent companies always conform to this mix of legal and ac-
counting logic. At each stage of the judicial process, accounting considerations are in-
troduced to strengthen the rationality of the decision made by the judges. Indeed, the
proceeding always begins with a cessation of payments and ends up with a liquidation
or continuation plans. To fix a point of time to signal the transition from a reliable and
sound company to a failing one, many scholars consider that the failure occurs from
the moment a company presents to the courts the legal documents required for its li-
quidation or reorganization. The failure is then assimilated to the entry in the insolv-
ency proceedings and filing for petition has to be considered as an extreme situation,
i.e., an exit from the market resulting from the mismatch between the entrepre-
neurial project and the market conditions.
Although the meaning and nature of the proceeding may differ, the arrival in a com-
mercial court which registers the cessation of payments gives a simple criterion to ‘ob-
jectively’ separate two classes of firms: those that are governed in accordance with the
rules of collective proceedings and those which are still operating in an economic world
dominated by the respect of contractual commitments. As in the previous set of papers,
the robustness of this conception rests upon the binary choice provided by the judicial
perspective: either the company is sound or it is insolvent. The judicial definition of in-
solvency has given rise to much research of which this entry provide only a brief glance.
Proposing an empirical analysis to check out the differences between legally insolvent
firms and those only reporting financial difficulties, Agarwal et al. (2001) determine a
performing function whose exact classification rates are above 93% for both groups. It
appears that models relying on a legal definition and separation of businesses into two
classes lead to more reliable results than the ones based upon financial performance
levels. Different reasons explain this superiority. Firstly, the differences between failing
and viable firms are clearer as one is closer to the cessation of payments. Secondly, the
transition between an economic order, dominated by commitments and contracts on
the one hand and a judicial universe in which pure market logic is supplanted by a legal
order on the other, is clearer than an assessment based on corporate performance.
Therefore, in the legal order, the sequence is structured by a threefold stage. Firstly, it
consists in the statement of cessation of payment. Secondly, it is followed by an arbi-
trage between direct liquidation and rescue which depends on the particular situation
of the insolvent firm and the context in which the decision is made. Thirdly, the valid-
ity of this decision is known later if the rescued firm effectively survives.
A large variety of causes of insolvency
A huge number of researches give attention to the causes of insolvency. Most of them pay
a considerable interest on nonfinancial aspects as specific causes of bankruptcy (from
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studies stress the importance of one factor, sometimes even within a specific type of com-
pany. However, even if it is widely admitted that insolvency is the result of a long and
intricated process, many papers and reports insist upon the significantly higher probability
of failure of specific types of companies. Size is then the first characteristic taken into con-
sideration as a key discriminant factor. For a long time, small businesses have been a
major concern for the authors involved in this field (Hall (1992) or, more recently, Back
(2005) is representative of this large set). However, the changes in the characteristics of
companies going bankrupt lead some other scholars to pay attention to the exit of large
corporations. Indeed, the bankruptcy of American large companies in the beginning of
the 2000sb question the failure of large corporate groups. Among many reasons and fol-
lowing the controversial paper by Charan and Useem (2002), managerial errors is often
presented as a major one whereas some others, rediscovering Kotler (1965) and consider-
ing that it can be profitable for corporate groups to abandon some activities, begin to
think about bankruptcy as a business strategy. These new directions still remain rare and,
as highlighted by Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008), ‘most of these studies declare manage-
ment characteristics to be the most critical factors in corporate bankruptcy’, whereas in-
solvency should be seen as a process in which different causes intervene at the different
stages. We examine these two points successively.
Different individual causes
Various studies have endeavoured to identify the causes of corporate bankruptcy which
can be as numerous and complex than factors leading growth. A comprehensive vision
of the possible causes of failure is provided by Bradley and Rubach (2002) who remind the
different families of the factors identified as causes of insolvency by a survey commissioned
by the Small Business Administration. Management, marketing, or financial reasons are the
main ones but should be precised as additional elements intervene, such as the following:
1. Outside business conditions: includes increase in competition, insurance, and
general costs of doing business
2. Financing: includes loss of capital, inability to secure new capital, and high debt
3. Inside business conditions: includes management mistakes, location, loss of clients,
and trade credit problems
4. Tax: includes problems with the tax administration
5. Disputes with a particular creditor: includes foreclosures, lawsuits, and contract
disputes
6. Personal: includes illness and divorce
7. Calamities: includes fraud, theft, natural disasters, and accidents
8. Other: includes buying time and involuntary bankruptcy filings
This research provides an appropriate framework to encompass the insolvency in a
complex framework. Some also succeed in identifying the profile of a vulnerable enter-
prise whose probability to go bankrupt is higher than the ‘normal’ risk of failure. Every-
body agrees that weak firms are naturally predisposed to go bust. The stake is then to
isolate some ratios or indicators that give an accurate representation of the firm fragil-
ity. Different families of causes of insolvency may be then compounded according to
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(1998) which provides a review of prior literature.
Size, age, and activity
The analysis of the possible causes of insolvency began with the introduction of firm
size, following Gibrat's law often considered in models of firm growth. Most of the re-
searchers agree upon the fact that the smaller the firm size, the greater the chance for
the firm to go bankrupt. Indeed, small firms do not have the amount of financial re-
sources or support from creditors as a buffer for market contractions. Moreover, small
organizations face difficulties in attracting the most competent personnel as they can-
not offer a career development equal to large organizations. Considering companies of
the US construction industry whose risk of failure increase initially with increasing age,
reach a peak point and decrease thereafter as companies grow older, Kale and Arditi
(1998) conclude that young failures can be attributable to inadequate resources and
capabilities (relative to initial endowments). On the opposite, older failures should be
attributable to a mismatch between resources and capabilities and the demands of the
competitive environment. These internal processes will manifest themselves in vulner-
able business models which fail to generate positive cash flow. The strength of the rela-
tionship varies with the context and, mainly, with the business climate in the industry.
A non-negligible part of research then proposes models in which mortality dynamics
depend on age, size, and population density mechanisms.
However, considering these structural variables as appropriate proxies to determine
the probability of bankruptcy cannot satisfy those who want to determine which firms
are more likely to default in order to use this information to make a right decision such
as in financing or advising managers. Indeed, as it comes from the paper by Coltorti
and Garofoli (2011), about the relationships between the firms' size and performances,
the reality of the insolvency problem cannot simply be bordered by some general indi-
cators. Indeed, empirical results of the analysis on the balance sheet data of medium-
sized firms of the manufacturing industry in four European countries have excluded
the positive relationships between the firms' size and performances (both for value
added per employee and for profitability rates). This should bring more caution with
the traditional and broadly admitted agreed interpretation of a positive relationship be-
tween exit and firms' size.
Progressively, other elements, more narrowly depending on the specific characteris-
tics of the firms, have been introduced. The inspiration directly flows from the
resource-based view which has principally been employed in the study of above-normal
performance but is also instructive in the context of below-normal performance.
Financial causes
In contradiction with the Modigliani-Miller theorem which states that under specific
assumptions, the value of a firm is unaffected by how that firm is financed, a large
number of works shed some light on the role plays by the financial structure in the vul-
nerability of the firm. It is generally admitted that companies in cessation of payments
are characterized by a lower level of long-term financial resources than sound ones.
This difference is still valid, even if less visible, when one firstly compares firms that
benefit from a rescue attempt to the ones that are immediately liquidated and secondly
compares surviving firms to definitely bankrupt ones.
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(Santomero and Visno 1977). They assume that the firm has a given amount of capital
(K) and that changes in K are random. Positive changes in K result from positive cash
flows from the firm's operations. Losses require the firm to liquidate assets. Implicitly,
this model assumes the firm is completely cut off from credit or security markets and
cannot raise funds via debt or equity issues. A company goes bankrupt when the mar-
ket (liquidation) value of its assets (K) falls below its debt obligations to outside
creditors.
One may consider that the interest coverage and market value of equity/total liabil-
ities are negatively correlated with the odds of corporate bankruptcy. In the same vein,
the likelihood of going bankrupt increases with the leverage level and capital intensity,
but decreases with the liquidity level and growth prospect of a firm. Some are also in-
terested in the expectations and appetite of shareholders as the smaller the stock re-
turn, the greater the chance for the firm to go bankrupt. Following the pecking order
theory, one can support the idea that companies prioritize their sources of financing
(from internal financing to equity) according to which the principle of least effort, or of
least resistance, preferring to raise equity as a financing means of last resort. Hence, in-
ternal funds are used first, and when they are depleted, debt is issued. When it is not
sensible to issue any more debt, equity is issued (Myers and Majluf 1984). The ability
of the firm to finance its investments by itself appears as a crucial factor for its stability.
Thus, a high initial level of financial resources (equity and long-term debt) can protect
the firm from a risk of failure.
Environment, sales, and market position
Other explaining variables have to do with the business and the market position of the
company. The firms which are able to sell their products are less likely subject to a ces-
sation of payments. It follows the ‘Porterian’ view according to which firms benefiting
from a dynamic geographical or industrial environment have a higher probability of
success than companies that do not benefit from such positive externalities. Indeed,
business failure is all the more probable as the firm faces difficulties in selling its prod-
uct which may cause a continuous decline in turnover as well as a decrease in profit-
ability. The higher importance of the capacity to create a good customer relationship is
pointed out by Shumway (2001) who finds that market variables are more useful than
financial ratios in predicting bankruptcy.
The macroeconomic context exerts a strong influence on company survivability. The
links between the changes in overall economic conditions and aggregate rates of cor-
porate liquidations have been in the focus of a large number of studies based on
economy-wide-level information. They conclude that economic cycles and shift in
prices have a strong influence on the sales.
Corporate governance and shareholders
Becchetti and Sierra (2003) include a group membership dummy in a prediction model
estimated on a large sample of Italian manufacturing firms, and find a negative rela-
tionship between probability of failure and business group membership between 1992
and 1997. This evidence can be enlarged. On average, firms integrated in large corpor-
ate groups are more likely to be supported by the parent company and thus less likely
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He et al. (2010) insist upon the fact that the odds of going bankrupt increase with the
level of restrictions imposed on corporate internal control.
All these different causes do not intervene independently in the process of failure but
combine each other. It means that no single cause is by itself able to ruin a company
but that involuntary exit such as bankruptcy is the result of an accumulation of events
producing a sequence whose pretictable end lies in bankruptcy.
In a complex process
In general, insolvency does not happen overnight. On the contrary, disruption in payments
can be expected from previous signals. Empirical works try to identify these signals using
either zeta score-based models or a more qualitative approach. Empirical evidence does
not show a clear causal relationship between good governance practices and good corpor-
ate performance. It is almost impossible to discriminate between a favorable economic
conjuncture and good practices as causes of success. Corporate insolvency will usually be a
predictable result of bad corporate governance when the company is still a going concern.
Figure 1 illustrates what can be described as a cumulative scenario towards insolv-
ency which may lead to either a direct liquidation or a judicial settlement involving the
continuation of the undertaking (creditors are obliged to accept certain deadlines) or
the transfer of the business (the undertaking and its main contracts are sold to a third
party who accepts certain commitments).
The decline of a company begins most of the time by mismanagement and unmarket-
able products (Crutzen and Van Caillie 2009) which may cause a decline in sales over
several years (and a correlative decrease in earnings if nothing is done to improveFigure 1 Insolvency path (Source: Marco 1989).
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in profitability, followed by a deterioration of operating conditions which are at the
origin of a solvency crisis. At this stage of the vicious circle, the company's man-
agers have a strong incentive to accept less favorable market conditions (rebates or
longer terms of payment, etc.) in the hope of restoring sales and profitability. Such
a reaction can however be counterproductive as it can cause an increase in trade
debts and inventories, especially in the manufacturing industry. As a consequence,
the company may be short of cash and, therefore, may face a liquidity crisis which
could lead lenders to practice credit rationing and increase interest rates since the
simultaneous increase of indebtedness and decrease in self-financing deteriorates
the probability of repayment of such a debtor. Subject to a shortage of financial re-
sources, to a decrease in the EBIT aggravated by an inability to repay the claims
once they fall due, the company may decide to file a petition for bankruptcy before
the creditors decide to present one to the commercial court. Once one of these
two possible events happens, the insolvency turns into bankruptcy. The arrival in a
judicial world changes the rules of the game drastically as the first consequence of
this switch lies in the automatic stay that halts actions by creditors trying to col-
lect debts. The stake is thus no longer to decide whether the company should re-
pay or not all the claimants but, instead, to make a decision concerning how much
debtors should repay in case of rescue or liquidation. The arguments in favor of
each solution may differ according to the institutional context on the one hand
and the company situation on the other.Forecasting and preventing failure
Understanding and predicting company default has been an area of extensive research for
at least 40 years. The literature exploring corporate failure started with the simple univariate
discriminant analysis approach, pioneered by Beaver (1966). His univariate analysis of a
number of bankruptcy predictors states that a number of indicators could discriminate be-
tween matched samples of failed and non-failed firms for as long as 5 years prior to failure.
His published sample contains 79 companies which failed during the years 1954 to 1964
from 38 industries. Beaver concludes that cash flow to debt ratio is the single best predictor.
Models of that kind are appealing in their simplicity, but their main disadvantage lies in
their inability to account for the coexisting effects of many different indicators of default.
Since Altman (1968), most of the models devoted to prediction of insolvency have
tried to determine the best function to distinguish reliable companies from those that
will possibly default in the near future. Altman selected 33 publicly traded manufactur-
ing companies which were declared bankrupt under Chapter X between 1946 and 1965
and matched them to 33 companies using a stratified random sample based on their as-
sets and industry. His famous Z scorec using five financial ratiosd correctly differenti-
ated 94% of failed companies and 97% of the non-failed companies with data 1 year out
from failure. This good performance contributed to the popularity of this approach.
Many contributions followed the one by Altman (among many, one can cite Deakin
(1972) or Blum (1974)). Their main purpose consists firstly to identify explanatory vari-
ables of default and to estimate their contribution, estimating the coefficients that make
it possible to accurately classify a set of firms in two a priori defined categories.
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field of economics and finance. Multiple discriminant analysis is a statistical technique
used to classify an observation into one of several a priori groupings dependent upon the
observation's individual characteristics. It is used primarily to classify and/or make predic-
tions in problems where the dependent variable appears in qualitative form, for example,
bankrupt or non-bankrupt. From this venerable models, an unmeasurable number of vari-
ants have been tested, either the number of indicators compounding the final score was
changed to improve the fitness of the index, or the formula was adapted to fit better with
peculiar situations such as specific activities (services, start-ups, …) or markets (emerging,
blue ships, …). Another generation of risk index models introduces the concept of
indexing the individual failure-predicting indicators; however, their approach shares the
same weaknesses of univariate analysis and provides largely arbitrary risk metrics.
Since the implementation of a linear function, numerous refinements have been pro-
posed. They mainly concern the estimation technique and consist in the implementa-
tion of semi-parametric (logistic) or non-parametric (neural networks) techniquese. The
logistic procedure fits linear logistic regression models for binary or ordinal response
data using Maximum Likelihood estimations and compares the estimated samples
whereas artificial neural network systems attempts to assign proper weights to the re-
spective inputs by a ‘genetic algorithm’ optimization procedure to allow for the correct
deduction of the ultimate outcome. Regardless, the result is always the same: once vali-
dated, the function becomes a predictive model of insolvency. The crucial point is that
this method requires a strict definition of failure resulting from a review of the litera-
ture and knowledge of default organization prior to any empirical analysis. Two polar
points of view coexist in the literature: an economic and a judicial one.
Despite their growing success, neural networks are still criticized due to the lack of
transparency concerning the estimation process: they are even suspected to be ‘black
boxes’ what is a real weakness whereas accuracy and information disclosure is required
from banks in determining the exposure at risk. That is why the judgement is still
balanced. On the one hand, neural networks, when effectively implemented and
validated, show potential for forecasting and prediction. On the other hand, a sig-
nificant portion of the neural network research in forecasting and prediction still
lacks validity. Anyway, currently, several of the major commercial loan default pre-
diction products are based on neural networks. For example, Moody's Public Firm
Risk Model (Online: www.moodyskmv.com) is based on neural networks as the
main technology. Many banks have also developed and are using proprietary neural
network default prediction models.
Nowadays there is a wide range of default prediction models, i.e., models that assign a
probability of failure or a credit score to firms over a given time horizon. The literature on
this topic has developed especially in connection with Basel II, which allows banks to set
up an internal rating system, that is, a system to assign ratings to the obligors and to quan-
tify the associate probabilities of default. The requirement of the microregulation of the
banking system and the increasing need of more accurate expectations on the exposure at
the loss of financial institutions are probably going to push up research on firm insolvency.
Nevertheless, a better knowledge on the causes of firms' failure is not only wished for an
improvement of financial sphere functioning. It can also encourage firm interest and com-
pany advisors to implement better practices of growth (Levratto and Paranque 2011).
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ation. Instead of being only a tool used by outsiders to make their decision about the
opportunity to lend money to companies, managers themselves can use the prediction
of failure as a signal. Indeed, the preparation of a business strategy may require instru-
ments for evaluating the possible outcomes of the new orientations decided by the
board. Simulations can thus be added to the tool box at the disposal of the managers to
determine which possibility is less risky.
But some external uses of insolvency prediction models may also be proposed. In-
deed, development agencies are increasingly faced with the question of evaluating the
efficiency of their support to the companies. A double constraint bears on their action:
avoiding the risk of dilution of their assistance on the one hand, and finding a satisfying
mix between long term but highly uncertain results and short term but often limited to
solvency consideration outcomes on the other hand. These economic development or-
ganizations can thus be interested in having at their disposal an evaluation method that
allows them to consider simultaneously short-term perspectives with medium-term
considerations that have something to do with survival.
From an academic point of view, one may thus consider that the existence of firm-
specific failure determinants offers support to the resource-based theory of the firm,
and contributes a more fine-grained perspective to the study of organizational ecology.
Conclusion
Over the past 35 years, corporate insolvency has been at the origin of a broad and in-
depth literature aiming at embracing legal and industrial features. Seen as a promising
way to have at disposal prediction models possibly used by banks, the firm exit has in-
creasingly become a fashionable topic. The crisis intensified the problems faced by
creditors to screen the potential borrowers and boosted the research in this field. The
increasing number of works is especially visible in two fields. An empirical analysis of
firm exit or default determinants which tends to provide a better knowledge of explana-
tory variables on the one hand and a methodological perspective mainly consisting in
testing new techniques on the other. In these two fields, the progress is really
perceptible.
Despite the significant progress done, two challenges remain to be tackled. The first
one deals with the fact that bankruptcy is more of a continuum than a dichotomous
variable. Whereas the other one has to do with the role of the institutional context
what makes it difficult to build a general model of bankruptcy prediction. Lets us com-
ment on each one briefly.
A new way of evaluating predictions has to be developed to renew the usual bin-
ary way to discriminate companies. The necessarily slow transition from a safe and
operating company to an insolvent and bankrupt one is not reflected by the one
vs. zero solution usually adopted. Creditors and lenders use starts with a list of
companies without a priori knowledge of how many are/will be bankrupt and then
the model is asked to classify each. The models should reflect these multiple solu-
tions what seems to support logistic techniques able to cope with different alterna-
tive situations.
The second stakes come from the fact that exit and insolvency are highly sensitive to
the legal and macroeconomic contexts. To depart from the determinist view which
Levratto Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship Page 14 of 152013, 2:20
http://www.innovation-entrepreneurship.com/content/2/1/20characterizes parametric models, scholars tend to prefer non-deterministic ones. How-
ever, they tend to hide the reason why firms fail. In the future, one can expect that
semi-parametric models will be preferred, even if that requires intensive tests to im-
prove their reliability as prediction tools. It is the price to pay to get a comprehensive
model of exit.
Endnotes
aThe term insolvency is commonly confused with bankruptcy whereas they refer to
close but different situations. Strictly speaking, both insolvency and bankruptcy deal with
liabilities exceeding assets. However, insolvency refers to a financial state and bankruptcy
to a distinct legal concept, a matter of law.
bThe bankruptcies of Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Kmart, Polaroid, Arthur
Andersen, Xerox, Qwest, etc. are representative of the weakness of the principle ‘too
big to fail’ in the manufacturing and service industries.
cThe Z-score is a quick way to assess the solvency of an organization - it can indicate
current and potential financial distress. A Z-score of less than 1.8 indicates a high prob-
ability of financial failure. Whereas a Z-score of greater than 3.0 indicates a low prob-
ability of financial distress.
dWorking capital/total assets, retained earnings before interest and taxes/total assets,
equity market value/book value of total debts, and sales/total assets.
eOhlson (Ohlson 1980), as a pioneer of the use of logit models, and the paper on
neural networks by Rahimian et al. (1996), only published in 1996 but written in 1991,
are representatives of the use of these new methods for bankruptcy prediction.
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